Electoral Reform: Plan A versus Plan B
President Claudia Sheinbaum’s electoral reform enters committee review in the Chamber of Deputies today and is expected to be sent to the plenum for a floor vote on Wednesday. Ricardo Monreal, Morena’s leader in the Chamber of Deputies, has acknowledged that without the support of coalition partners PT and PVEM, the government does not currently have the two-thirds majority required to pass a constitutional reform (so-called Plan A). That has shifted the public discussion toward another question: what could still move forward in a Plan B based on secondary legislation (which requires just 51% of the Congressional vote).
The structural redesign of Congress clearly sits in Plan A territory. If the constitutional reform fails, Morena cannot simply reduce the Senate from 128 to 96 seats, because the current composition — including 32 proportional-representation senators — is anchored in Article 56 of the Constitution. Similarly, the constitutional structure of the Chamber of Deputies — 300 majority districts and 200 proportional-representation seats — cannot be changed without constitutional reform.
Where the line becomes less clear is in how those 200 proportional deputies are selected. Sheinbaum’s proposal would replace the current party-list system with a hybrid formula that includes “best losers,” regional lists and migrant deputies. Many legal analysts treat that redesign as constitutional because Article 54 describes the system as one of regional lists. However, some press commentators and legal observers have raised the possibility that certain elements of the selection method could be modified through secondary legislation, though doing so would almost certainly face legal challenge.
In practice, that creates a grey area between Plan A and Plan B. A constitutional reform would clearly allow Morena to fully redesign the proportional representation system. But a more aggressive Plan B could still attempt partial modifications through ordinary legislation — especially if the government calculates that the current Supreme Court, which Morena-aligned justices control, would very likely uphold the changes.
Party financing presents a similar distinction. The core funding formula — based on 65% of the daily UMA multiplied by the electoral roll and distributed 30% equally and 70% according to vote share — is written into Article 41 of the Constitution. The presidential initiative proposes reducing the percentage used in the calculation, which analysts estimate would lower total public funding for parties by roughly 22%. A strict constitutional reading suggests this reduction would require constitutional reform. However, some observers note that certain operational adjustments around campaign financing or party spending rules could still be implemented through secondary legislation and easily survive legal challenges given Morena’s control of the judiciary.
Beyond the institutional architecture of Congress and party financing, there is broader room for Plan B reforms affecting the functioning of the electoral system. Analysts have pointed out that the initiative leaves many operational details undefined and explicitly requires Congress and local legislatures to update secondary laws by May 15, 2026, suggesting that a large portion of the reform’s practical impact would come through ordinary legislation (requiring just 51% majority) rather than constitutional text.
Several elements of the proposal can uncontroversially move forward without constitutional change. One example is the reduction in official broadcast time during campaigns, which the reform would cut from 48 to 35 minutes per day. Specialists estimate that this would eliminate roughly 15 million campaign spots across Mexico’s radio and television stations during an electoral cycle. Critics warn that the reduction could weaken parties’ communication capacity while potentially leaving more broadcast time available either to the government or to commercial broadcasters.
Another component of the reform is the attempt to tighten financial controls around campaign financing, with a stated focus on preventing money laundering and drug money from entering elections. On paper, that means closer coordination between electoral authorities, financial regulators and intelligence bodies, stricter limits on cash, and greater reliance on traceable financial channels. The political logic is clear, but the practical impact is less certain.
That said, Mexico’s problem has rarely been the absence of formal rules; it has been weak detection, selective enforcement against the governing party and limited institutional capacity to uncover illicit money before it shapes an election. Unlike the redesign of Congress or the constitutional formula for party financing, these measures are feasible under Plan B, since they could be pursued through secondary legislation and regulatory changes. The question is whether they would amount to a real shift in enforcement or simply a tougher-looking framework on paper. And many will ask whether the government would enforce the rules against its own party, or just against the opposition.
Analysts have also highlighted that the reform contains several operational changes to electoral procedures, including adjustments to the way vote counts and election administration are conducted. Many of these details remain only partially defined in the public text, which means the electoral authority itself could end up filling important gaps through regulation and guidelines.
What is highly likely, whether Plan A or Plan B advances, is that the combination of changes to representation rules, campaign resources and communication regulations would shift the competitive environment in favour of the governing coalition. Plan A would redesign the electoral architecture. Plan B would operate more at the margins, but under favourable judicial conditions, those margins could still prove politically meaningful.
From Ballots to Bots: Mexico Writes AI into the Electoral Rulebook
For the first time, Mexico’s electoral framework would also venture into the regulation of artificial intelligence, bringing the technology explicitly into the constitutional conversation. The reform introduces an obligation to label electoral content generated through AI, requiring that materials such as synthetic audio, manipulated video or algorithmically generated messages be clearly identified. The responsibility would not fall solely on political actors. Television broadcasters, radio stations and digital platforms would also be required to detect and flag such content when it circulates within the electoral context. In practical terms, the proposal attempts to place a regulatory perimeter around one of the most volatile elements of modern campaigning: synthetic political communication.
Supporters frame the provision as a necessary response to two increasingly visible distortions in democratic processes: the industrial use of bots and the rapid proliferation of AI-generated disinformation. The reform seeks to prohibit automated accounts designed to manipulate public debate while establishing strict transparency rules for synthetic content, including deepfakes, cloned voices and algorithmically generated campaign messaging. The underlying rationale is straightforward: if campaign financing must be traceable, the origin of political information should be traceable as well. In that sense, the initiative treats digital manipulation as another integrity risk for elections, alongside illicit financing or organised interference.
Yet analysts caution that legislating technology is rarely as simple as drafting the rule. Regulating AI is fundamentally different from regulating traditional propaganda. Algorithms evolve faster than statutes, and the technical challenge of distinguishing automated influence operations from legitimate citizen activity remains unresolved. Enforcing a ban on bots raises practical questions: how will authorities differentiate a coordinated network from an enthusiastic online supporter? Who audits AI models during an electoral blackout period? The reform therefore signals an important shift — acknowledging that electoral integrity now extends into algorithmic territory — but its success will depend less on constitutional language and more on the technical capacity of regulators to enforce it without constraining legitimate expression.
Arbitration Untouched: The Supreme Court Clarifies the Boundaries
Mexico’s Supreme Court has delivered a clarifying — and for the arbitration community, reassuring — ruling on the recently enacted General Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Ley MASC). In resolving the constitutional challenge brought through an amparo review, the Court confirmed the law’s validity while drawing a firm line around what it does not regulate. Contrary to early concerns in parts of the legal community, the Court concluded that the statute does not intrude into the legal framework governing commercial arbitration nor alter the functioning of private mediation services. For companies operating in cross-border transactions or complex commercial disputes, the message is straightforward: the arbitration regime remains intact.
The Court’s reasoning relied on a systematic constitutional interpretation rather than a strictly literal reading of the statute. Under that interpretation, the law applies primarily to self-compositional mechanisms such as mediation and conciliation, while arbitration continues to operate under its specialised regime established in the Commercial Code and international instruments.
That distinction matters for legal certainty. The Court explicitly confirmed that the core functions of arbitral institutions — appointment of arbitrators, conduct of proceedings, issuance of awards and recognition and enforcement processes — remain governed exclusively by the existing arbitration framework. No additional regulatory layer, oversight requirement or procedural constraint arises from the new law.
Equally important, the ruling aligns Mexico’s domestic interpretation with its commitments under the New York Convention, the Panama Convention and the USMCA, all of which require states to facilitate arbitration and avoid regulatory barriers that could undermine the effectiveness of arbitral awards.
Chatter box
- USMCA Talks: The Starting Gun Fires on the 16th. Mexico is preparing to formally enter the next phase of USMCA consultations, with March 16 marking the starting gun for the first round of structured conversations with the United States. Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard presented the results of a nationwide consultation process that included all 32 states, more than 30 economic sectors, labour organisations, agricultural producers and business chambers, arguing that the exercise provides Mexico with a clear negotiating mandate. The headline finding is political as much as economic: roughly 78.5% of participants support maintaining the treaty, reinforcing the government’s position that the agreement remains a cornerstone of Mexico’s growth strategy. In short, the consultations close the preparation phase — and March 16 opens the negotiating one.
- Golden Pensions Under Review. Mexico’s Senate is set to debate a constitutional reform this week aimed at curbing what the government has labelled “golden pensions” within the public sector. The initiative, promoted by President Claudia Sheinbaum, proposes an amendment to Article 127 of the Constitution establishing that retirement benefits for senior officials in public entities may not exceed 50% of the salary of the President of the Republic. Senate President Laura Itzel Castillo confirmed that the measure will move first through the Joint Committees on Constitutional Points and Legislative Studies, which are scheduled to approve the draft before sending it to the Senate floor for debate and a vote later in the week. Substantively, the reform targets pensions granted to senior staff in decentralised agencies, state-owned enterprises, development banks, majority state-owned companies and public trusts at the federal, state and municipal levels. The constitutional language would also prohibit labour agreements or legal arrangements that establish retirement conditions exceeding the proposed ceiling.
- Today, the Chamber of Deputies’ Oversight Committee for the Federal Superior Audit Office (ASF) is set to determine the three finalists for the position of Auditor General for the 2026–2034 term. Committee chair Javier Herrera indicated that the shortlist will be composed of the top-rated candidates from the evaluation process and may include an affirmative measure to ensure gender representation if no woman ranks among the top three.
Contact:
Laura Camacho
Executive Director Miranda Public Affairs
laura.camacho@miranda-partners.com
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