Now Mexico’s turn: Complaining about CDMX Gentrification by Americans
As Mexico was emerging from the economic impact of the pandemic, then-Mexico City Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum announced in October 2022 an alliance with UNESCO and Airbnb to boost tourism and promote the city as a destination for “digital nomads”. (You can find the press release here, if you’re wondering if that was AI-generated.) Less than three years later, the situation has changed dramatically. The debate around gentrification is hardly new, but it has become a lightning rod in Mexico City’s political discourse following the protests held on July 4, not because of a few vandalized storefronts, but for their explicitly xenophobic signs and chants, particularly against Americans (“Gringo, go home!” “Speak Spanish or Die!” “Gentrification is colonization!”, as reported by the New York Times).
President Sheinbaum condemned the violence during her Monday press conference, stating that “Mexico is an open and welcoming country.” (Somewhat tellingly, Mayor Clara Brugada first addressed the violence until the fifth paragraph of her official statement). By now, however, it has become a minor diplomatic issue. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security responded with irony on social media:
Screenshots from the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security X account (1 and 2)
The message was clear: two can play the anti-immigrant game. And while DHS may have been trolling, it signaled something deeper — that Washington is watching, and it’s ready to capitalize politically.
Democracy Makeover: Fewer Seats, More Control
With the spotlight elsewhere, a far more consequential project is quietly taking shape: an electoral reform effort that could fundamentally reshape Mexico’s democratic framework. President Sheinbaum has telegraphed the outline of what may become the most significant restructuring of the system since the democratic transition — one that places proportional representation, the INE, and minority legislative rights squarely on the chopping block.
The centerpiece: a sharp reduction — or outright elimination — of so-called plurinominal seats in both chambers of Congress. In their place, Sheinbaum has floated a “first minority” system: awarding representation to some candidates who come in second in their races. It sounds democratic — even inclusive — but in practice, it overwhelmingly favors large parties. The political math is simple: if Morena doesn’t win a district outright, it can still pick up seats through the alternative path.
Though no official draft has been circulated — not even Morena’s lower-house leader Ricardo Monreal has one in hand — the principles are already public. The Sheinbaum government wants fewer public funds for parties, cheaper elections, and a tighter link between candidates and voters. “No more anonymous list candidates,” as she put it. In fact, the changes may go even further. Sheinbaum has also proposed slashing the number of municipal council members — regidores and síndicos — framing them as costly and unaccountable remnants of a bloated political system.
One outcome is highly likely. The changes will for sure favor Morena, already the dominant party by far, by reducing minority over-representation.
The Price of Protection: Harfuch’s War on extortion
As extortion continues to strangle Mexico’s economy and public life, the federal government has launched a National Strategy against it — a move that, while overdue, has sparked both cautious optimism and some skepticism. Led by Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch, the plan rests on four pillars: addressing root causes, consolidating the National Guard, strengthening intelligence and investigation, and improving coordination with state authorities. It also includes the creation of a new Deputy Ministry for Intelligence and Police Investigation, tasked with prosecuting crimes like extortion and kidnapping more effectively.
In parallel, Mexico City, under Mayor Clara Brugada, has rolled out a local campaign titled “Juntas y Juntos Contra la Extorsión” (Together Against Extortion), including a dedicated anti-extortion hotline, and a legislative proposal to stiffen penalties. A specialized prosecutor’s office will focus on cobro de piso (protection racket) and phone-based extortion — both rampant in the capital.
The strategy has received notable backing from the private sector. The Business Coordinating Council (CCE) of Guerrero publicly endorsed the initiative, calling it a “robust and comprehensive” response to a crime that has deeply impacted a wide array of sectors like tourism, construction, agriculture, mining, transport, and hospitality. In its statement, the CCE underscored how extortion has threatened investment and employment in key industries.
But critics remain cautious. Without systemic reform in local law enforcement and a drastic reduction in impunity, even the best frameworks risk becoming more political theater than public policy. And in a country where trust in security institutions is brittle, implementation will be the real test.
From the Ring to the Crosshairs: Julio César Chávez Jr. and the Sinaloa Shadow
Julio César Chávez Jr., the son of Julio César Chávez, one of the greatest boxers in Mexican and world boxing history (a six-time world champion across three weight divisions), and himself a professional boxer and WBC Middleweight champion in 2011, now finds himself facing a very different kind of fight: accusations of involvement with drug cartels. Just days after losing a high-profile bout, Chávez Jr. was arrested by ICE agents in Studio City, California, and charged with immigration fraud and alleged ties to the Sinaloa Cartel. According to the Department of Homeland Security, Chávez Jr. failed to disclose a critical detail in his green card application: a personal link — through his wife — to Édgar Guzmán, son of “El Chapo.” DHS now labels him a national security threat, citing both this connection and an open arrest warrant in Mexico for arms trafficking and organized crime.
Mexican authorities appear to be catching up. President Claudia Sheinbaum confirmed that Chávez Jr. has been under investigation by the Attorney General (FGR) since 2019. She acknowledged, however, that she had not been briefed on the case until recently — a surprising admission, considering the high profile of the suspect.
Allegedly connected to cartel operatives like El Nini and publicly claiming friendship with Ovidio Guzmán, Chávez Jr.’s case raises troubling questions for both sides of the border. How does someone with public cartel associations and an active warrant manage to compete on U.S. soil and navigate immigration channels with apparent ease? While the Trump administration appears eager to showcase this arrest as a triumph of law enforcement, critics point out the political theater behind targeting a famous, troubled figure. And though the Mexican government has promised cooperation, the fact that Chávez Jr. was able to fly under the radar for so long suggests that authorities on both sides of the border might have been looking the other way for too long.
Contact:
Gilberto García
Partner and Head of Intelligence
gilberto.garcia@miranda-partners.com
Laura Camacho
Executive Director Miranda Public Affairs
laura.camacho@miranda-partners.com
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