Implications of Morena’s fractures
Deepening fractures within Morena could offer Claudia Sheinbaum an opportunity—or a looming threat. If she succeeds in asserting control over the ruling party’s increasingly divided factions, she could consolidate power and strengthen her presidency. But if discipline continues to erode, the divisions may undermine her leadership from within and expose her administration to destabilizing infighting.
In summary, more than ever, the ruling party’s internal divisions have become a matter of state. What once played out behind closed doors in party councils or campaign war rooms is now entangling the government, even if the end game is far from clear.
As Morena scrambles to reinforce its grassroots ahead of the next electoral cycle, the party has launched a second national tour to install more than 71,000 sectional committees—described as the “organizational backbone” of the party. These units, composed of local loyalists, will meet every Sunday from now until late 2026, tasked with spreading the gospel of the Fourth Transformation and managing internal party discipline. But behind the rhetoric of popular empowerment lies a clear strategic goal: 2027. That year, over 1,000 local congressional seats, 680 mayoralties, and 17 governorships will be on the ballot, including the full renewal of the Chamber of Deputies.
Two of the party’s most recognizable names were missing: Ricardo Monreal and Andrés Manuel López Beltrán. The Majority Leader at the Chamber of Deputies chose not to attend due to a “personal event” (said to be a birthday party in Madrid). The latter, the party’s Organizational Secretary —and son of the former president—was said to be dealing with “personal matters.” No further details were offered.
The absences came just days after the arrest warrant for Hernán Bermúdez, former Tabasco security chief and longtime ally of Adán Augusto López, who, after much speculation, did attend the Council—and was applauded. That applause echoed awkwardly against the headlines. Bermúdez, it now turns out, is accused of heading “La Barredora” a criminal cell with roots in the Beltrán Leyva cartel, known for trafficking migrants, fuel theft, and extortion in southeastern Mexico. It’s not a good look for Adán, who governed Tabasco until 2021.
Party leader Luisa María Alcalde declare that “Morena does not protect those who betray our principles.” It sounded like a cliché. Whether more will come from it, remains to be seen.
Renegotiation, Rebranded: What Lutnick Didn’t Say Out Loud
Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick was on CBS’s Face the Nation, one of the longest-running Sunday morning shows in the U.S. In his words, President Trump is merely correcting “an 80-year wrong,” opening up global markets, and boosting U.S. GDP by up to 1.5%. “Unless they open their markets, they’re going to pay a tariff,” he declared, referring to Canada—delivering a threat dressed as economic populism.
But the climax part was when he said: “I think the President is absolutely going to renegotiate USMCA, but that’s a year from today…It makes perfect sense for the President to renegotiate it. He wants to protect American jobs”.
What Lutnick left unsaid is where the real complexity lies: the actual meaning of “renegotiate” in this context. The USMCA, like NAFTA before it, required simple-majority approval in both chambers of Congress to take effect. If Trump intends to go beyond tactical tariffs and genuinely reopen the agreement, that effort would likely trigger a full legislative process: new negotiation authority from Congress, and eventually, a new vote to ratify any revised deal.
While Trump will likely retain a functional majority in the Senate, his margin in the House remains razor-thin—and fractured. He faces a bloc of anti–free trade Republicans skeptical of global integration, plus Democrats who are just as protectionist, but for different reasons. The math gets even trickier when one considers that many of the concessions Trump would have to make—to win votes—could alienate his own coalition or jeopardize enforcement credibility.
Thus, one should heed caution when “renegotiation” enters the conversation. Is it just a revision—tweaks that stay within executive authority—or a true overhaul requiring full legislative involvement – a process President Trump may prefer to skip? And all this assumes that Trump is willing to negotiate with Mexico and Canada in good faith.
Strong Turbulence Ahead: Washington Goes After Mexico’s Airspace
The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) just issued a not-so-subtle regulatory airstrike, accusing Mexico of breaching the 2015 U.S.–Mexico Air Transport Agreement. Sharply escalating matters, the USDOT deployed three overlapping measures to tighten oversight of cross-border aviation: Firstly, all Mexican airline schedules will be subject to prior approval by U.S. authorities; secondly, formal authorization will be required for any charter flights operating between the two countries; and lastly, a Show-Cause Order puts the longstanding Delta–Aeroméxico joint venture—protected by antitrust immunity—on notice for potential revocation. While framed as procedural safeguards, they function as a coordinated pressure mechanism, signaling that compliance is no longer optional, and bilateral goodwill has its limits.
This isn’t some bureaucratic turf war over air traffic logistics, but the culmination of two years of friction. Since 2022, Mexico has been reducing takeoff and landing slots at the overcrowded Mexico City International Airport (AICM)—impacting both U.S. and Mexican carriers.
In 2023, Washington watched as U.S. cargo airlines were ordered to relocate their operations from AICM to AIFA. The industry’s lobbyists evidently sprang into action, and now, Washington has come out to defend its interests.
The message was as clear as it gets. According to Lauren Beyer, president of the Cargo Airline Association (CAA), the U.S. is drawing a line: it will no longer tolerate unfair or anti-competitive behavior that violates the spirit of Open Skies agreements and puts American carriers at a disadvantage. The group warned that Mexico’s actions—particularly the forced relocation of cargo operations—didn’t just disrupt critical logistics and set a dangerous precedent for the global treatment of cargo airlines. They also raised troubling questions about how future security emergencies might be handled in a system where rules shift without warning and commercial aviation is routed through military-run infrastructure.
President Sheinbaum’s response stuck to her usual playbook: measured, procedural. No need for sanctions, she claimed at her Monday press conference. Everything is technical. No formal complaint has been received. She invited affected airlines to coordinate with the Infrastructure Ministry, Defense, and Navy.
But beneath the calm exterior, turbulence is building. Delta and Aeroméxico—whose joint venture is now dangling on a regulatory thread—warned the U.S. that terminating their antitrust immunity would be “punitive, premature, and ineffective.” Delta alone has over 20 cross-border routes at stake.
Moreover, this dispute carries real economic and logistical risks for Mexico. With the 2026 FIFA World Cup just around the corner—to be co-hosted by the U.S., Mexico and Canada—any disruption to cross-border mobility could create cascading effects far beyond trade metrics. The stakes are not just diplomatic or commercial; they’re reputational. Mexico will need to move quickly toward a negotiated solution before global attention—and global traffic—arrive.
Contact:
Gilberto García
Partner and Head of Intelligence
gilberto.garcia@miranda-partners.com
Laura Camacho
Executive Director Miranda Public Affairs
laura.camacho@miranda-partners.com
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